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1 Introduction
This last decade, production games have been introduced in the literature
in order to study the formation of coalitions and its impact on productivity
measurement. Through the prism of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and
cooperative games, Lozano (2012) shows that firms may share some infor-
mation (data) about inputs and outputs of their processing units in order
to improve their benefits. Lozano (2013) studies DEA production games
in which different firms have the possibility to merge either with their own
technology or with a joint coalitional technology. The same idea is studied in
Briec and Mussard (2014) in which firm games may help to find some coali-
tional technologies associated with an improvement of allocative efficiency
and a decline of technical efficiency.
Following Chambers, Chung and Fa¨re (1996, 1998), technical efficiency
may be measured by the directional distance function.1 Peyrache (2013)
shows that this distance function has appealing interpretations related to
the chosen direction. It allows the firm physical output loss to be measured
in terms of the numeraire (output orientation), and it can also be interpreted
as the firm physical input waste (input orientation). Recently, Ravelojaona
(2019) investigates the employ of a generalized directional distance function
based on the generalized mean over inputs and outputs in order to distort
the usual technologies in such a way that it becomes possible to measure
technical efficiency with non-linear technologies. However, no connection
has been proposed with firm games, that is, to investigate the measurement
of technical efficiency with aggregate technologies, especially for technologies
with constant returns to scale (CRS) and α-returns to scale.
In this paper, the aggregation of technology sets is generalized thanks
to an aggregator inspired from Ben-Tal (1977) and Hardy, Littlewood and
Po´lya (1934), who characterize the generalized mean studied by Ravelojaona
(2019). We introduce firm games in which several aggregate technologies
(also termed coalitional technologies or joint technologies) are designed with
the aid of the generalized mean aggregator. First, all firms may have a tech-
nology with constant returns to scale, see e.g. Li and Ng (2001) for CRS
technologies of groups of firms. Second, all firms may have a technology with
α-returns to scale and may decide to merge in order to create a new aggregate
technology. In both cases, there may be either no technical efficiency varia-
tion, improvement or decline of technical efficiency due to cooperation (for all
possible merging firms). Those three cases are captured by the aggregation
bias, i.e. the difference between the inefficiency of the firm coalition and the
(generalized mean) of the firm inefficiencies. It is shown that the aggrega-
tion bias may be either negative (cooperation improves technical efficiency),
positive (decline of technical efficiency), or null.
1See also Chambers and Fa¨re (1998) for the duality theory.
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CRS technologies are associated with a new concept of directional com-
plementarity in inputs and in outputs issued from the directional distance
function. The directional complementarity in inputs postulates that an in-
crease in input i implies an improvement of technical efficiency due to the
role of all inputs but i in producing a given output vector. In the case where
all firms have CRS technologies with directional input complementarity and
employ the same technique, the aggregation bias is null, that is, the mean of
the firms inefficiencies over each coalition corresponds to the inefficiency of
the coalition computed on the coalitional technology, implying no incentive
to merge (the core of the game is empty). On the contrary, the directional
output complementarity postulates that an decrease in output j implies an
improvement of technical efficiency due to the role of all outputs but j in
using a given input vector. In this case, a null aggregation bias is recorded,
but it is not incompatible with the incentive to merge (the core interior
is non-void) because each coalition aims at maximizing its outputs. These
results generalize the approach suggested by Li (1995) with regard to the
characterization of CRS technologies as convex cones, which become gener-
alized convex cones in the context of firm games. The firms may also merge
when their technologies all exhibit α-returns to scale. In this firm game,
the core interior of the game is not trivially derived. It is shown, for each
possible coalition, that the aggregate technology embodied with α-returns to
scale is characterized by both directional output and input complementarity
and by subadditive games, therefore the technical efficiency of each coalition
increases with cooperation. Moreover, in this case, the aggregation bias is
negative: the inefficiency of the firm coalition is lower than the generalized
mean of the firm inefficiencies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the notations. Section
3 defines the generalized mean and the firm games. Section 4 introduces
directional complementarity. Sections 5 and 6 present the results about
CRS aggregate technologies and α-returns to scale aggregate technologies,
respectively, and the (non)-existence of the core of the firm game. Section 7
concludes.
2 Setup
Notations and definitions. The set of positive integers is denoted N+, the
non-negative part of the real line is R+ and R++ is its positive part (with Rn+
and Rn++ its n-dimensional representation). The set {1, . . . , ℓ} is denoted [ℓ]
for any integer ℓ in N+. The interior of set E is denoted
◦
E. Let α ∈ R \ {0}
and φα : R −→ R be a real and bijective power map defined as follows:
φα(θ) =

θα if θ > 0
−|θ|α if θ < 0
0 if θ = 0.
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The power function over Rd, is defined by the map Φα : Rd −→ Rd, such
that for any vector z = (z1, . . . , zd) ∈ Rd:
Φα(z) =
(
φα(z1), . . . , φα(zd)
)
.
Definition 2.1 – Generalized Mean:
(i) For u = (u1, . . . , ud) ∈ Rd, the generalized mean over R+ is expressed as:
φ−1α
(
φα(u1) + · · ·+ φα(ud)
)
= u1
α
+ · · · α+ ud :=
φα∑
k∈[ℓ]
uk
(ii) For z1, . . . , zℓ ∈ Rd, the generalized mean over Rd+ is expressed as:
Φ−1α
(
Φα(z
1) + · · ·+ Φα(zℓ)
)
= z1
α
+ · · · α+ zℓ :=
Φα∑
k∈[ℓ]
zk.
(iii) The limits of the generalized mean over Rd++ are expressed, for all zk ∈
Rd++, as follows:2
lim
α→−∞
Φα∑
k∈[ℓ]
xk =
∧
k∈[ℓ]
xk1, . . . ,
∧
k∈[ℓ]
xkd
 := (min
k∈[ℓ]
xk1, . . . ,min
k∈[ℓ]
xkd
)
lim
α→+∞
Φα∑
k∈[ℓ]
xk =
∨
k∈[ℓ]
xk1, . . . ,
∨
k∈[ℓ]
xkd
 := (max
k∈[ℓ]
xk1, . . . ,max
k∈[ℓ]
xkd
)
lim
α→0
Φα∑
k∈[ℓ]
xk =
∏
k∈[ℓ]
xk1, . . . ,
∏
k∈[ℓ]
xkd
 .
The generalized mean has been characterized and analyzed by Hardy,
Littlewood and Po´lya (1934). It has been employed in welfare economics
and economic inequality by Atkinson (1970), and characterized by Blackorby
et al. (1981) among others, in order to aggregate utility or incomes for the
specification of social welfare functions and inequality measures.3
The firms use inputs and produce outputs. Let x ∈ Rn+ and y ∈ Rm+ be the
input and output vectors, respectively. The n-dimensional [m-dimensional]
vector of zeros is 0n [0m], the same thing for vectors of ones 1n [1m], and
finally ≥ [≤] denotes inequalities over scalars and > [6] over vectors.
Assumptions. The technology T of the firms might satisfy the following
standard assumptions outlined in the literature of productivity measurement.
1. There is no free lunch:[
(0n, 0m) ∈ T, (0n, y) ∈ T
]
=⇒ [y = 0m]. (T1)
2See Briec (2015) for the operator of the generalized mean over Rd and its limits.
3See also Ben-Tal (1977) for the notion of generalized convex functions.
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2. The set A(x) of dominating observations is bounded, i.e., infinite outputs
cannot be obtained from a finite input vector:
A(x) := {(u, y) ∈ T : u 6 x}, ∀x ∈ Rn+. (T2)
3. The set T is closed, i.e., for all sequences (xs, ys)s of T ,[
lim(xs, ys) = (x, y) ∈ Rn+m+
]
=⇒ [(x, y) ∈ T ]. (T3)
4. Fewer outputs can always be produced with more inputs:[∀(x, y) ∈ T, (x,−y) 6 (u,−v)] =⇒ [(u, v) ∈ T ]. (T4)
5. The technology exhibits Constant Returns to Scale (CRS):[∀λ ≥ 0, (x, y) ∈ T ] =⇒ [(λx, λy) ∈ T ]. (T5)
6. The technology exhibits α-returns to scale, if for all (x, y) ∈ Rn+m++ :[∀λ > 0, (x, y) ∈ T ] =⇒ [∀α ∈ R, (λx, λαy) ∈ T ]. (T6)
Given a production set one can define an input correspondence of firm k
by Lk : Rm+ −→ 2Rn+ and the output correspondence of firm k as P k : Rn+ −→
2R
m
+ such that the technology of firm k in N is expressed as follows:
T k =
{
(xk, yk) ∈ Rn+m+ : xk ∈ Lk(yk)
}
=
{
(xk, yk) ∈ Rn+m+ : yk ∈ P k(xk)
}
,
where the couple (xk, yk) denotes the input-output vector of firm k. The
technical (in)efficiency of firm k is measured by distance functions. The
directional distance function (Chambers, Chung and Fa¨re, 1996, 1998) of
firm k, DTk : Rn+m+ ×−Rn+ × Rm+ −→ R+, is given by:
DTk(x
k, yk; g) = sup
δ
{
δ ∈ R : (xk − δgi, yk + δgo) ∈ T k
}
.
The less (the more) the distance of the couple (xk, yk) to the technology
frontier of T k, the more the (in)efficiency is.
The set of firms (players) is fixed and finite, it is given byN := {1, . . . , |N |},
where |N | ≥ 2. The subsets of the grand coalition N are denoted by S. A
transferable utility game, i.e. a TU-game, is a pair (N, v), where v is defined
as v : 2N → R+ such that v(∅) := 0. The set of all maps v is denoted Γ, such
that v(S) provides the worth of coalition S. A valued solution ϕ(v) is the
payoff vector of the TU-game (N, v) that is a n-dimensional real vector that
represents what the firms could take benefit from cooperation. The function
ϕ is called a value or an allocation.
3 Firm games and aggregate technologies
In this Section, we define firm games with aggregate technologies issued from
the generalized mean. Moreover Farrell’s structural and industrial technical
efficiencies are introduced in order to define the bias of aggregation.
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3.1 Firm games defined on generalized means
In production theory, Li and Ng (2001) and subsequently by Briec and Mus-
sard (2014), introduced the aggregate technology. In their frameworks, the
technology of the grand coalition is the standard sum of input and output
vectors. Following this specification, the technology of any given coalition
S ⊆ N is the standard sum of the technologies T k of each firm k ∈ S:
T S :=
∑
k∈S
T k =
{(∑
k∈S
xk,
∑
k∈S
yk
)
: (xk, yk) ∈ T k
}
.
This specification is dropped in order to investigate aggregate technologies
in firm games based on the generalized mean.
Definition 3.1 – Firm Game: A firm game defined on the generalized
mean operator is a triplet (N, v,Φα) with α ∈ R \ {0} such that the resulting
aggregate technology of coalition S ⊆ N after cooperation is:
T Sα :=
Φα∑
k∈S
T k =
{(
Φα∑
k∈S
xk,
Φα∑
k∈S
yk
)
: (xk, yk) ∈ T k
}
.
The game v : 2N → R provides the technical efficiency of all possible coali-
tions S ⊆ N with aggregate technology T Sα , for which the characteristic func-
tion is DTSα :
v(S) ≡ DTSα
(
Φα∑
k∈S
(xk, yk); g
)
≥ 0, with v(∅) = 0.
The greater DTSα is, the more the technical inefficiency of coalition S ⊆ N
is. The technical inefficiency of a group of firms is computed on the basis
of the aggregate technology inherent to the firm game by which each firm
may decide (or not) to cooperate with other firms in order to create a greater
technical efficiency at the sectoral level. The measure DTSα may be compared
with individual technical efficiencies DTk to judge whether the cooperation
improves the technical efficiency of coalition S.
3.2 Farrell’s technical efficiency measurement and ag-
gregation bias
Following Farrell (1957), the technical efficiency may be computed at the sec-
toral level following two types of indices, based on the simple sum of input
and output vectors. Since the technologies are defined on the generalized
mean, we specify Farrell’s definitions as follows. A firm game (N, v,Φα)
yields the structural technical inefficiency : DTSα
( Φα∑
k∈S
(xk, yk); g
)
. The struc-
tural technical inefficiency DTSα of coalition S based on the generalized mean
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of inputs xk and output yk of firms k in S corresponds to the technical ef-
ficiency of the group issued from the aggregate technology T Sα , that is, the
firms k in coalition S merge. Industrial technical inefficiency is defined as∑φα
k∈S DTk(x
k, yk; g). The industrial technical inefficiency is the generalized
mean of the firms’ inefficiencies. In some cases, both measures of aggregate
efficiency do not always coincide, that is,
φα∑
k∈S
DTk(x
k, yk; g) S DTSα
(
Φα∑
k∈S
(xk, yk); g
)
, S ⊆ N.
(i)
∑φα
k∈S DTk(x
k, yk; g) > DTSα
( Φα∑
k∈S
(xk, yk); g
)
: The technical efficiency
of coalition S measured on the joint technology T Sα is greater than the mean
of technical efficiency issued from the individual technologies T k.
(ii)
∑φα
k∈S DTk(x
k, yk; g) < DTSα
( Φα∑
k∈S
(xk, yk); g
)
: The joint technology T Sα
does not provide a greater technical efficiency than the mean of the individual
technical efficiencies.
(iii)
∑φα
k∈S DTk(x
k, yk; g) = DTSα
( Φα∑
k∈S
(xk, yk); g
)
: The (generalized)
mean of the technical efficiencies of the firms is equivalent to the techni-
cal efficiency they can expect with a new coalitional technology issued from
cooperation.
The difference between the structural and the industrial technical effi-
ciency is said the aggregation bias.
Definition 3.2 – Aggregation Bias: For all firm games (N, v,Φα), the
aggregation bias of coalition S ⊆ N of size |S| ≥ 2 is defined as follows:
ABα(S; g) := DTSα
(
Φα∑
k∈S
(xk, yk); g
)
−
φα∑
k∈S
DTk(x
k, yk; g).
Briec and Mussard (2014) show, under assumptions (T1)-(T4), that the
aggregation bias may be positive or negative. In particular, the aggregation
bias of allocative efficiency is non-positive, meaning that the aggregate tech-
nology based on the simple sum of inputs and outputs vectors yields a greater
allocative efficiency than the sum of the individual efficiencies. On the other
hand, for these aggregate technologies, the aggregation bias of technical effi-
ciency is non-negative.4
We show below, without invoking any restriction on the firm game under
the usual assumptions (T1)-(T4), that the aggregation bias is always non-
negative. This result parallels that of Briec and Mussard (2014) in which the
aggregate technology is issued from the simple sum of inputs and outputs.
4See also Briec et al. (2003) for the special case of null aggregation bias.
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Proposition 3.1 (non-negative bias) Suppose a firm game (N, v,Φα) such
that each firm’s technology T k of coalition S satisfies (T1)-(T4) for all k ∈ S.
Then, the aggregation bias in the direction of g is non-negative:
ABα(S; g) = DTSα
(
Φα∑
k∈S
(xk, yk); g
)
−
φα∑
k∈S
DTk(x
k, yk; g) ≥ 0, ∀S ⊆ N.
Proof:
Let us begin with some claims.
Claim 3.1 For all α ∈ R \ {0} and a, b, c > 0, the generalized mean α+ is
associative:
(a
α
+ −b) α+ c = −b α+ (a α+ c).
Claim 3.2 The directional distance function is translatable. For all γ > 0:
DTk(x
k − γgi, yk + γgi; g) = DTk(xk, yk; g)− γ.
Following the previous claims, we have for all k ∈ S and all α ̸= 0:(
xk
α
+ −DTk(xk, yk; g)gi, yk
α
+ DTk(x
k, yk; g)go
)
∈ T k
⇐⇒ DTk
((
xk
α
+ −DTk(xk, yk; g)gi, yk
α
+ DTk(x
k, yk; g)go
)
; g
)
≥ 0.
By the definition of the firm game, we have for all S ⊆ N :(
Φα∑
k∈S
(
xk
α
+ −DTk(xk, yk; g)gi
)
,
Φα∑
k∈S
(
yk
α
+ DTk(x
k, yk; g)go
))
∈
Φα∑
k∈S
T k = T Sα
⇐⇒ DTSα
(
Φα∑
k∈S
xk
α
+ −
φα∑
k∈S
DTk(x
k, yk; g)gi,
∑
k∈S
yk
α
+
φα∑
k∈S
DTk(x
k, yk; g)go; g
)
≥ 0
⇐⇒ DTSα
(
Φα∑
k∈S
xk,
Φα∑
k∈S
yk; g
)
α
+ −
φα∑
k∈S
DTk
(
xk, yk; g
) ≥ 0
⇐⇒ DTSα
(
Φα∑
k∈S
xk,
Φα∑
k∈S
yk; g
)
≥
φα∑
k∈S
DTk
(
xk, yk; g
)
⇐⇒ ABα(S; g) ≥ 0.
The previous result outlines, under (T1)-(T4), that the aggregate tech-
nology T Sα issued from the firm game provides a greater inefficiency than
the current average of the individual technical inefficiencies. We will see in
Section 5 that the sign of the aggregation bias may change with respect to
complementarity assumptions.
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4 Directional complementarity
In this Section we introduce complementarity properties derived from the
directional distance function, the so-called directional complementarity. The
literature outlines two standard definitions of complementarity:
(i) Input complementarity: An aggregate technology with input comple-
mentarity requires that the demand of input i decreases as the price of input
j increases (e.g. the case of Leontief production functions).
(ii) Output complementarity: An aggregate technology with output com-
plementarity requires that the supply of output ℓ decreases as the price of
output h decreases (e.g. the case of Kohli’s (1983) technology).
We propose below, on the one hand, a new definition of input comple-
mentarity based on the directional distance function without imposing price
effects. This definition postulates that an increase in input i implies an
improvement of technical efficiency due to the role of all inputs but i in pro-
ducing a given output vector. Let g = (h, k) ∈ Rn+ × Rm+ and let us denote
I+(h) = {i ∈ [n] : hi > 0}. Let {e1, · · · , en} and {f1, · · · , fm} denote the
canonical basis of Rn and Rm respectively. In the following we say that the
direction is non-canonical if |I+(h)| ≥ 2.
Definition 4.1 – Directional input complementarity: Let h ∈ Rn+
be a non-canonical input directional vector. For all i ∈ [n] let us denote
h−i =
∑
r∈[n]\{i} hrer. For all y ∈ Rm+ , we say that the input set satisfies
a complementarity assumption in the direction of h if for all x ∈ L(y), all
δ > 0 and any i ∈ [n]
DT (x+ δei, y;h−i, 0m) ≤ DT (x, y;h−i, 0m).
If for all non-canonical direction vectors h, L(y) satisfies a complementarity
assumption in the direction of h, then we say that it satisfies a directional
input complementarity assumption.
We also propose, on the other hand, a new definition of output com-
plementarity without taking recourse to price effects. It postulates that an
decrease in output j implies an improvement of technical efficiency due to
the role of all outputs but j in using a given input vector.
Definition 4.2 – Directional output complementarity: Let k ∈ Rm+ be
a non-canonical output directional vector. For all j ∈ [m] let us denote k−j =∑
s∈[m]\{j} ksfs. For all x ∈ Rn+, we say that the output set P (x) satisfies a
complementarity assumption in the direction of k if for all y ∈ P (x), all
δ > 0 and any j ∈ [m]
DT (x, y − δfj; 0n, k−j) ≤ DT (x, y; 0n, k−j).
If for all non-canonical direction vectors k, P (x) satisfies a complementarity
assumption in the direction of k, then we say that it satisfies a directional
output complementarity assumption.
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Input and output directional complementarity assumptions are depicted
in Figure 1 below.
x21yL(y)P x)− δf1+ eInput ComplementarityOutput Complementarity
Figure 1. Input and Output Directional Complementarity
On the one hand, technologies with directional input complementarity
are characterized with the aid of assumptions (T3) and (T4). Notice that
for all output vectors y, if L(y) has an infimum element it is denoted inf{x :
x ∈ L(y)}.
Proposition 4.1 (characterization of directional input complemen-
tarity) Suppose that the input set is closed (T3) and satisfies a free disposal
assumption (T4). Then the input set satisfies a directional complementarity
assumption in input if and only if,
L(y) = inf{x : x ∈ L(y)}+ Rn+.
Proof:
Suppose that L(y) = inf{x : x ∈ L(y)}+ Rn+. Let us denote x = inf{x : x ∈
L(y)}. Then for all i ∈ [n],
DT (x+ δei, y;h−i, 0m) = min
k∈[n]\{i}
{
xk + δ − (xk + δ)
hk
}
.
For any i ∈ [n], the result is independent of i. Therefore for all δ > 0,
DT (x+ δei, y;h−i, 0m) = min
k∈[n]\{i}
{
xk − xk
hk
}
= DT (x, y;h−i, 0m),
which proves complementarity. Conversely, suppose the complementarity
assumption in input for all positive input directions and let us prove that
L(y) has a minimum point. Suppose that this is not true and let us show
a contradiction. In such a case one can find two points x′ and x′′ lying on
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the boundary of L(y) such that x′ ∧ x′′ /∈ L(y). This implies that there are
i′ ̸= i′′ such that x′i′′ < x′′i′′ and x′i′ > x′′i′ . By hypothesis δ = (x′′i′′ − x′i′′) > 0,
therefore
DT
(
x′ + (x′′i′′ − x′i′′)ei′′ , y; ei′ , 0m
)
= x′i′ − x′′i′ > xi′ − (x′ ∧ x′′)i′ .
However, since
DT
(
x′ + (x′′i′′ − x′i′′)ei′′ , y; ei′ , 0m
)
= xi′ − (x′ ∧ x′′)i′ ,
we have a contradiction, which ends the proof.
On the other hand, technologies with directional output complementarity
are also characterized with the aid of assumptions (T3) and (T4). For all
input vectors x, if P (x) has a supremum element then it is denoted sup{y :
y ∈ P (x)}.
Proposition 4.2 (characterization of directional output complemen-
tarity) Suppose that the output set is closed (T3) and satisfies a free disposal
assumption (T4). Then the output set satisfies a directional complementarity
assumption in output if and only if,
P (y) = (sup{y : y ∈ P (x)} − Rm+ ) ∩ Rm+ .
Proof:
Mutatis Mutandis in the proof of Proposition 4.1.
Both concepts of directional complementarity may be now connected to
aggregate CRS technologies.
5 Firm games and CRS technology
In this section we investigate constant returns to scale technologies for coali-
tions of firms. We first characterize CRS technologies for coalitions of firms
by generalizing the concept of arcwise connected cone (Li, 1995) associated
with CRS technologies. Then, the game relying on this aggregate technol-
ogy is characterized. Finally, we prove that the core of the game exists and
may be non-empty for technologies exhibiting directional complementarity
in outputs.
5.1 Characterizations of the game and CRS technology
Li and Ng (2001) and Li (1995) establish some links between convex tech-
nologies and the aggregate technology of a group of firms based on the simple
arithmetic mean of the technologies. The aggregation of inputs and outputs
is performed by the operator Φα in order to generalize Li and Ng’s approach.
This generalization is issued from the notion of Φα-convex technology, which
generalizes the usual notion of convex technology.
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Definition 5.1 Φα-convex technologies: A subset C of Rd++ is Φα-convex
if for all z, w ∈ C and all s, t ∈ [0, 1] such that s α+ t = 1, we have sz α+ tw ∈
C. An aggregated Φα-convex technology is given by:
Φ−1α (Φα(T ) + Φα(T )) = T
α
+ T = {z α+ w : z, w ∈ T}, α ∈ R \ {0}.
On this basis, let us characterize the aggregate Φα-convex technology for a
group of firms.
Lemma 5.1 A technology T is Φα-convex if, and only if,
β1T
α
+ β2T = (β1
α
+ β2)T, ∀β1, β2 > 0.
Proof:
[if]: Let β1
α
+ β2 = 1 and the “if” part follows.
[only if]: Suppose T is Φα-convex. Then for z
1, z2 ∈ T we get that (β1/β)z1
α
+
(β2/β)z
2 ∈ T with β = β1
α
+ β2. Equivalently, we have (β1z
1)α + (β2z
2)α ∈
βαΦα(T ). Since Φα is bijective this implies that β1z
1
α
+ β2z
2 ∈ βT , and
so β1T
α
+ β2T ⊆ βT = (β1
α
+ β2)T . On the other hand, let z
α ∈ Φα(T ),
then (β1
β
z)α ∈ (β1
β
)αΦα(T ) and (
β2
β
z)α ∈ (β2
β
)αΦα(T ), then (
β1
β
z)α + (β2
β
z)α ∈
(β1
β
)αΦα(T )+(
β2
β
)αΦα(T ). Multiplying the previous expression by β
α, we get
that βα1 z
α + βα2 z
α ∈ βα1Φα(T ) + βα2Φα(T ). Since Φα is bijective this yields
(β1
α
+ β2)z ∈ β1T
α
+ β2T . Since β = β1
α
+ β2 then βz ∈ β1T
α
+ β2T and so
βT ⊆ β1T
α
+ β2T , thus βT ⊆ β1T
α
+ β2T , which ends the proof. The reader
is referred to Li and Ng (2001) for the standard convex case.
By Lemma 5.1, it can be shown that the Φα-convex technology of coalition
S is independent of the number of firms inside coalition S whenever these
firms have the same technology. Moreover, if the firms have all the same
technology, the aggregation bias remains non-negative.
Proposition 5.1 (independence) Let (N, v,Φα) be a firm game such that
each firm’s technology of coalition S ⊆ N is given by βkT k with T 1 = · · · =
T |S| = T , with T k being Φα-convex for all k ∈ S and with
∑φα
k∈S βk = 1.
Then, the following results hold for all S ⊆ N such that |S| ≥ 2 and α ∈
R \ {0}.
(i) The technology T Sα of coalition S is Φα-convex: T Sα =
∑Φα
k∈S βkT
k = T .
(ii) ABα(S; g) ≥ 0.
Proof:
(i) and (ii) follow from Lemma 5.1 and Proposition 3.1.
Now we can analyze CRS technologies based on the previous results. If
constant returns to scale is satisfied by all members of coalition S, then
the aggregate technology also satisfies constant returns to scale, however the
aggregation bias remains non-negative, consequently the cooperation cannot
improve the technical efficiency of coalition S.
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Proposition 5.2 (aggregate CRS technology) Let (N, v,Φα) be a firm
game such that each firm’s technology of coalition S ⊆ N given by T k is
Φα-convex and respects (T5) for all k ∈ S such that |S| ≥ 2 and α ∈ R\{0},
then the following results hold for all S ⊆ N .
(i) T Sα =
∑Φα
k∈S T
k respects (T5).
(ii) ABα(S; g) ≥ 0.
Proof:
(i) Let z, w ∈ T Sα , we have to prove that λz
α
+ λw ∈ T Sα , with z =
∑Φα
k∈S z
k
and w =
∑Φα
k∈S w
k. Thus:
λz
α
+ λw = λ
Φα∑
k∈S
zk
α
+ λ
Φα∑
k∈S
wk =
Φα∑
k∈S
(λzk
α
+ λwk).
Since T k is Φα-convex and respects (T5), then
zk
α
+ wk ∈ T k =⇒ λzk α+ λwk ∈ T k.
Thus,
Φα∑
k∈S
(λzk
α
+ λwk) ∈
Φα∑
k∈S
T k = T Sα ,
and so, the aggregate technology T Sα respects (T5).
(ii) It follows from Proposition 3.1.
A similar result can be established with the aid of arcwise connected
cone, introduced by Li (1995), which implies (T5). We first show the relation
between arcwise connected cone and Φα-convex cone, from which constant
returns to scale follow.
Proposition 5.3 (CRS characterization) Let (N, v,Φα) be a firm game
and let T \ {0} ⊆ Rn+m+ be an arcwise connected cone being Φα-convex for
some α ̸= 0. Then, the following results hold.
(i) T
α
+ T is a Φα-convex cone.
(ii) T
α
+ T respects (T5).
(iii) If in addition the technologies of coalition S ⊆ N are such that T k = T
for all k ∈ S, then T Sα =
∑Φα
k∈S T
k = T ∀S ⊆ N .
(iv) ABα(S; g) ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ N .
Proof:
(i) From Li (1995), if T is an arcwise connected cone, then T+T is a convex
cone. By definition,
T
α
+ T = Φ−1α (Φα(T ) + Φα(T )).
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Since T is Φα-convex, it follows that Φα(T ) is convex. From Li (1995), we
deduce that Φα(T ) +Φα(T ) is convex. Hence Φ
−1
α (Φα(T ) +Φα(T )) = T
α
+ T
is Φα-convex. To prove that T
α
+ T is a Φα-convex cone, we must prove that
λ(T
α
+ T ) = T
α
+ T for all λ > 0:
λ(T
α
+ T ) = λ
(
Φ−1α
(
Φα(T ) + Φα(T )
))
= Φ−1α
(
φα(λ)Φα(T ) + φα(λ)Φα(T )
)
= Φ−1α
(
Φα(λT ) + Φα(λT )
)
= Φ−1α
(
Φα(T ) + Φα(T )
)
= T
α
+ T.
(ii) Let z, w ∈ T α+ T , we have to prove that λz α+ λw ∈ T α+ T : see the
proof of Proposition 5.2 (i).
(iii) From Li and Ng (1995), if T k is a convex cone then
∑
k∈S T
k = T . If T
is Φα-convex, then Φα(T ) is a convex cone. Thus, from Li and Ng (1995):
Φα(T ) =
∑
k∈S
Φα(T
k) =⇒ T = Φ−1α
(∑
k∈S
Φα(T
k)
)
=
Φα∑
k∈S
T k.
(iv) It follows from Proposition 3.1.
An example of aggregate technology based on the generalized mean and
respecting assumption (T5) is the following.
Example 5.1 An example of CRS technology is for instance the production
set, for tj the jth element of a vector t,
T Sα =
{
(x, y) ∈ Rm+n+ : x >
Φα∑
j∈S
tjx
j, y 6
Φα∑
j∈S
tjy
j, t ∈ R|S|+
}
.
From Boussemart et al. (2009), it satisfies a constant returns to scale as-
sumption (T5).
As can be seen in the previous result, the structural technical efficiency
remains lower than or equal to the industrial technical efficiency when CRS
technologies are invoked for all firms of a given coalition. In order to make
both measures of aggregate technical efficiency to be equal, the same tech-
nique has to be employed by each firm of the coalition. In this case, it can be
proven that a null aggregation bias implies that the characteristic function
of the game is a generalized mean of input and outputs vectors.
Proposition 5.4 (game characterization) Let (N, v,Φα) be a firm game
and let T \ {0} ⊆ Rn+m+ be an arcwise connected cone being Φα-convex for
some α ̸= 0 and respecting (T1)-(T4) such that T k = T for all k ∈ S, and
such that each firm k ∈ S employs the same technique i.e. xki = βijxkj ,
ykℓ = γℓpy
k
p , x
k
i = δipy
k
p where βij, γℓp, δip are constant for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and for all ℓ, p ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Then, the following results hold:
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(i) T Sα =
∑Φα
k∈S T
k = T respects (T5) and ABα(S; g) = 0 ∀S ⊆ N .
(ii) For zk := (xk, yk) ∈ Rn+m+ , the game v is given by:
v(S) ≡ DTSα
(
Φα∑
k∈S
zk; g
)
=
(∑
k∈S
n+m∑
ℓ=1
bℓ(z
k
ℓ )
α
) 1
α
, ∀S ⊆ N
where bℓ ≥ 0, for all ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , n+m}.
Proof:
(i) Since xki = βijx
k
j , y
k
ℓ = γℓpy
k
p , x
k
i = δipy
k
p for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for
all ℓ, p ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, then it exists (t, w) ∈ T such that (xk, yk) = αk(t, w).
Therefore,
DTSα
(
Φα∑
k∈S
(xk, yk); g
)
= DTSα
(
Φα∑
k∈S
αk(t, w); g
)
=
φα∑
k∈S
αkDTSα (t, w; g) .
Since T Sα = T = T
k by Proposition 5.3, then
φα∑
k∈S
αkDTSα ((t, w); g) =
φα∑
k∈S
DTSα (αk(t, w); g) =
φα∑
k∈S
DTk(x
k, yk; g).
Hence,
DTSα
(
Φα∑
k∈S
(xk, yk); g
)
=
φα∑
k∈S
DTk(x
k, yk; g),
and the result follows.
(ii) By result (i), let ABα(S; g) = 0 for all α ̸= 0 and let fS := DTSα and
fk := DTk . For all S ⊆ N such that |S| ≥ 2:
ABα(S; g) = 0 ⇐⇒ fS
(
Φα∑
k∈S
(xk, yk)
)
=
φα∑
k∈S
[
fk(x
k, yk)
]
.
Thus,
fS
[
Φα
−1
(∑
k∈S
Φα(x
k, yk)
)]
= φ−1α
(∑
k∈S
φα
[
fk(x
k, yk)
])
.
Let us denote the vector zk := (xk, yk) ∈ Rn+m+ such that uk := Φα(zk), then:
φα
(
fS
[
Φ−1α
(∑
k∈S
uk
)])
=
∑
k∈S
φ
[
fk(z
k)
]
.
Set φα ◦ fS =: φS and φα ◦ fk =: φk, for all k ∈ S. Since zk = Φα−1(uk), then
φS
[
Φ−1
(∑
k∈S
uk
)]
=
∑
k∈S
φk
[
Φ−1(uk)
]
.
15
The previous expression is the well-known Pexider’s equation of solution (see
Acze´l, 1966, p.141):
φS ◦ Φα−1
(∑
k∈S
uk
)
= c ·
(∑
k∈S
uk
)
+
∑
k∈S
ck ;
φk ◦ Φα−1(uk) = c · uk + ck ,
where the vector c ∈ Rn+m+ and the constants ck ∈ R+ are set to be non-
negative in order to get a well-defined distance function (being non-negative).
The solution can be rewritten in a general setting as:
φα ◦ fk(zk) = c · (zk)α + ck , ∀k ∈ S,
and,
φα ◦ fS
(
Φα∑
k∈S
zk
)
= c ·
∑
k∈S
(zk)α +
∑
k∈S
ck , ∀S ⊆ N.
Consequently, the game is expressed as:
v(S) ≡ fS
(
Φα∑
k∈S
zk
)
=
(
c ·
∑
k∈S
(
zk
)α
+
∑
k∈S
ck
) 1
α
, ∀S ⊆ N.
Setting c := (b1, . . . , bn+m), we get:
DTSα
(
Φα∑
k∈S
zk; g
)
=
(∑
k∈S
n+m∑
ℓ=1
bℓ(z
k
ℓ )
α +
∑
k∈S
ck
) 1
α
, ∀S ⊆ N.
Following Chambers, Chung and Fa¨re (1996, 1998), the directional distance
function is homogeneous of degree 1 in inputs and outputs. For all λ > 0:
DTk
(
λxk, λyk; g
)
= λDTk
(
xk, yk; g
)
.
This implies
∑
k∈S ck = 0, thus:
v(S) ≡ DTSα
(
Φα∑
k∈S
zk; g
)
=
(∑
k∈S
n+m∑
ℓ=1
bℓ(z
k
ℓ )
α
) 1
α
, ∀S ⊆ N.
Based on the previous result, it is possible to analyze whether the coali-
tions lead to stable solutions lying in the core of the game.
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5.2 CRS technologies, core and complementarity
In Section 4, technologies with either input or output directional comple-
mentarity have been characterized with the minimum use of inputs and the
maximum use of outputs, respectively. As a consequence, the coalitional
technologies based on the generalized mean (with α→ ±∞) are welcome to
capture these directional complementarity assumptions. These technologies,
see Andriamasy et al. (2017), are the following:
T S+∞ := lim
α→+∞
Φα∑
k∈S
T k =
{
(x, y) ∈ Rn+m++ : x >
∨
k∈S
tkx
k, y 6
∨
k∈S
tky
k, t > 0
}
T S−∞ := lim
α→−∞
Φα∑
k∈S
T k =
{
(x, y) ∈ Rn+m++ : x >
∧
k∈S
tkx
k, y 6
∧
k∈S
tky
k, t > 0
}
.
The aim of this subsection is to establish a link between the directional
complementarity assumption, the core of firm games and CRS Φα-convex
technologies.
The core of the firm game relies on individual rationality and collective
rationality. Let ϕ ∈ Rn be a value inherent to the firm game.
(i) Individual rationality : ϕk ≤ DTk
(
xk, yk; g
)
, for all k ∈ N .
(ii) Collective rationality :
∑
k∈S ϕk ≤ DTS
(∑Φα
k∈S(x
k, yk); g
)
, for all S ⊆
N .
The individual rationality means that each firm exhibits less technical
inefficiency ϕk than its stand alone technical inefficiency DTk . The collective
rationality means that if each firm inside a coalition S decides to cooperate
with others, then the resulting technical inefficiency is lower than the aggre-
gate inefficiency of the coalition. The core of the firm game is concerned with
both rationalities.
Definition 5.2 The core of the firm game (N, v,Φα) is the set of imputations
ϕ ∈ Rn+ that respect individual and collective rationality:
CDT =
{∑
k∈S
ϕk ≤ v(S),∀S ⊂ N
}
∩
{∑
k∈N
ϕk = v(N)
}
We show below that the existence of the core depends on CRS technologies
that exhibit directional complementarity in outputs.
Proposition 5.5 (core and complementarity) Let (N, v,Φα) be a firm
game and let T \ {0} ⊆ Rn+m++ be an arcwise connected cone being Φα-convex
respecting (T1)-(T4) with T k = T for all k ∈ S and α ∈ R \ {0}. Each firm
k ∈ S employs the same technique i.e. xki = βijxkj , ykℓ = γℓpykp , xki = δipykp
where βij, γℓp, δip are constant for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for all ℓ, p ∈
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{1, . . . ,m}. Then, the firm game (N, v,Φα) with a finite number of firms
yields the following results.
(i) If T Sα =
∑Φα
k∈S T
k such that α→∞ for all S ⊆ N , then:
(i.a) T S+∞ satisfies directional output complementarity for all S ⊆ N .
(i.b)
◦
CDT ̸= ∅.
(ii) If T Sα =
∑Φα
k∈S T
k such that α→ −∞ for all S ⊆ N , then:
(ii.a) T S−∞ satisfies directional input complementarity for all S ⊆ N .
(ii.c)
◦
CDT= ∅.
Proof:
(i.a) It follows from Proposition 4.2.
(i.b): From Shapley (1972), any given convex game provides a solution in the
core. Since the game v(S) corresponds to the industrial technical inefficiency
of coalition S, it represents a cost. Following the cost-sharing literature, the
core is non-empty whenever the game is concave i.e.,
v(S ∩R) + v(S ∪R) ≤ v(S) + v(R), ∀S,R ⊆ N. (5.1)
From the conditions imposed in the Proposition, the results of Proposition
4.2 and 5.4 apply: limα→+∞ABα(S; g) = 0 for all S ⊆ N , that is,
v(S) ≡ DTSα
(∨
k∈S
(xk, yk); g
)
= max
k∈S
DTk((x
k, yk); g), ∀S ⊆ N.
Then, by Eq.(5.1):
max
k∈S∩R
DTk((x
k, yk); g) + max
k∈S∪R
DTk((x
k, yk); g)
≤max
k∈S
DTk((x
k, yk); g) + max
k∈R
DTk((x
k, yk); g), ∀S,R ⊆ N.
• First suppose that maxk∈S∪RDTk((xk, yk); g) = maxk∈S DTk((xk, yk); g),
then Eq.(5.1) becomes:
max
k∈S∩R
DTk((x
k, yk); g) ≤ max
k∈R
DTk((x
k, yk); g), ∀S,R ⊆ N,
and because S ∩R ⊆ R, the previous expression is always true.
• Second, suppose that maxk∈S∪RDTk((xk, yk); g) = maxk∈RDTk((xk, yk); g),
then Eq.(5.1) becomes:
max
k∈S∩R
DTk((x
k, yk); g) ≤ max
k∈S
DTk((x
k, yk); g), ∀S,R ⊆ N,
and because S ∩R ⊆ S, the previous expression is always true.
• Third, suppose that maxk∈S∪RDTk((xk, yk); g) = maxk∈S∩RDTk((xk, yk); g),
then Eq.(5.1) becomes:
max
k∈S∩R
DTk((x
k, yk); g) + max
k∈S∪R
DTk((x
k, yk); g)
=max
k∈S
DTk((x
k, yk); g) + max
k∈R
DTk((x
k, yk); g), ∀S,R ⊆ N.
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Therefore Eq.(5.1) is always respected. By Shapley (1972), the core is non-
empty. Since the Shapley value is the barycenter of the core, the result
follows.
(ii.a) It follows from Proposition 4.1.
(ii.b): By Proposition 4.1 and 5.4: limα→−∞ABα(S; g) = 0 for all S ⊆ N ,
therefore
DTSα
(∧
k∈S
(xk, yk); g
)
= min
k∈S
DTk((x
k, yk); g), ∀S ⊆ N.
• First suppose that mink∈S∪RDTk((xk, yk); g) = mink∈S DTk((xk, yk); g),
then Eq.(5.1) is violated because,
min
k∈S∩R
DTk((x
k, yk); g) ≥ min
k∈R
DTk((x
k, yk); g), ∀S,R ⊆ N.
• Second, suppose that mink∈S∪RDTk((xk, yk); g) = mink∈RDTk((xk, yk); g),
then Eq.(5.1) is violated since,
min
k∈S∩R
DTk((x
k, yk); g) ≥ min
k∈S
DTk((x
k, yk); g), ∀S,R ⊆ N.
• Third, suppose that mink∈S∪RDTk((xk, yk); g) = mink∈S∩RDTk((xk, yk); g),
then Eq.(5.1) becomes:
min
k∈S∩R
DTk((x
k, yk); g) + min
k∈S∪R
DTk((x
k, yk); g)
=min
k∈S
DTk((x
k, yk); g) + min
k∈R
DTk((x
k, yk); g), ∀S,R ⊆ N.
The three cases above provide:
min
k∈S∩R
DTk((x
k, yk); g) + min
k∈S∪R
DTk((x
k, yk); g)
≥min
k∈S
DTk((x
k, yk); g) + min
k∈R
DTk((x
k, yk); g), ∀S,R ⊆ N
that is,
v(S ∩R) + v(S ∪R) ≥ v(S) + v(R), ∀S,R ⊆ N.
Therefore, the core is empty, and this ends the proof.
The interpretation of the non-vacuity of the core is related to the algebraic
structure of the aggregate technology being a Φα-convex cone. Let us take
en example with the well-known Shapley (1953) value.
Example 5.2 (Shapley value) Let us consider a 3-firm game. It is as-
sumed that the technology T \ {0} ⊆ Rn+m++ is an arcwise connected cone
being Φα-convex and respecting (T1)-(T4) such that T
k = T for all k ∈ S
and each firm employs the same technique. Therefore, by Proposition 5.4,
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AB+∞(S; g) = 0 for all S ⊆ N . In words, the structural technical ineffi-
ciency of coalition S measured by v(S) is equal to the industrial technical
inefficiency of coalition S.
v(S) ≡ DTSα
(
lim
α→+∞
Φα∑
k∈S
(xk, yk); g
)
= lim
α→+∞
φα∑
k∈S
DTk((x
k, yk); g).
For notational convenience, the singleton {i} is denoted i for any firm i in
N . For the ease of the example, it is assumed that v(1) ≤ v(2) ≤ v(3).
Therefore,
v(S) = max
k∈S
DTk((x
k, yk); g). (5.2)
In words, v(3) is the technical inefficiency of firm 3 and also is the technical
inefficiency of the coalitions {1, 3}, {2, 3} and N . The technical inefficiency
of firm 2, v(2) also is that of the coalition {1, 2}. Moreover,
v(1) + v(2) + v(3) ≤ v(N) = v(3).
That is, the coalition of all 3 firms alleviates the burden reached by cumulating
the firm’s inefficiencies when they do not cooperate. Therefore, each firm’s
contribution to bear the structural technical inefficiency can be less than its
stand-alone technical inefficiency. If so, the allocation is individually rational
because every firm has an incentive to cooperate.
Let us show that the core of (N, v,Φ∞) is non-empty since the Shapley
value lies in. The Shapley value defined on the firm game (N, v,Φα) is a
valued solution Sh : Γ→ Rn expressed as, for all α ∈ R \ {0},
Shk(v,Φα) :=
∑
S⊆K\{k}
(n− 1− |S|)!|S|!
n!
[v(S ∪ k)− v(S)] , k ∈ N.
By Eq.(5.2), the Shapley allocation for every player is as follows.
Sh1(v,Φ∞) =
1
3
v(1) ; Sh2(v,Φ∞) =
1
2
v(2)− 1
6
v(1) ;
Sh3(v,Φ∞) = v(3)− 1
2
v(2)− 1
6
v(1).
The value is individually rational:
Sh1(v,Φ∞) ≤ v(1) ; Sh2(v,Φ∞) ≤ v(2) ; Sh3(v,Φ∞) ≤ v(3).
The allocation is also collectively rational. If two firms cooperate, both
share the burden of the least efficient firm among them. If all firms cooper-
ate, they share, once again, the cost of the least efficient firm among them.
Formally,
∑
k∈S Shk ≤ v(S) for all S ⊆ N . Indeed, if firms 1 and 2 cooper-
ate, they share the burden due to firm 2’s technical inefficiency. Therefore,
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firm 1 bears less than it would bear for its own stand-alone inefficiency and
the same applies for firm 2. The statement holds true for any coalition.
a) For S = {1, 2}:
Sh1(v,Φ∞) + Sh2(v,Φ∞) =
1
6
v(1) +
1
2
v(2)
=⇒ Sh1(v,Φ∞) + Sh2(v,Φ∞) ≤ v(2).
b) For S = {1, 3}:
Sh1(v,Φ∞) + Sh3(v,Φ∞) =
1
6
v(1) + v(3)− 1
2
v(2)
=⇒ Sh1(v,Φ∞) + Sh3(v,Φ∞) ≤ v(3).
c) For S = {2, 3}:
Sh2(v,Φ∞) + Sh3(v,Φ∞) = v(3)− 1
3
v(1)
=⇒ Sh2(v,Φ∞) + Sh3(v,Φ∞) ≤ v(3).
d) The last step to check for collective rationality of the allocation is
straightforward since
∑
k∈N Shk = v(N):
Sh1(v,Φ∞) + Sh2(v,Φ∞) + Sh3(v,Φ∞)
=
1
3
v(1) +
1
2
v(2)− 1
6
v(1) + v(3)− 1
2
v(2)− 1
6
v(1)
= v(3)
= max
k∈N
v(k)
= v(N) (since AB∞(N ; g) = 0).
Based on a)–d), the core of the firm game is non void whenever limα→∞ABα(S; g) =
0 for all S ⊆ N .
When the structural technical inefficiency of the group of firms corre-
sponds to the industrial technical inefficiency (limα→∞ABα(S; g) = 0), this
means that coalition S gets the average of technical efficiency of the firms in
S. However, the previous result shows that each firm has still some interest
to merge with others in order to reduce its technical inefficiency (the core
is non-empty). When they merge, the new aggregate technology TS satisfies
directional complementarity in outputs. This result may be generalized to a
firm game with α-returns to scale.
6 Technologies with α-Returns to Scale
Let us investigate Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)-Constant Elas-
ticity of Transformation (CET) models introduced by Fa¨re et al. (1988).
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These models have been generalized by Boussemart et al. (2009) with α-
returns to scale, in which the output part is characterized by a CET expres-
sion and the input part by a CES expression.
The coefficient of returns to scale α is decomposed into two parts: α =
q/r > 0, with q, r ∈ R \ {0}. Assume that A = {(xk, yk) : k ∈ S} ⊂ Rm+n++ ,
then the following model (see Andriamasy et al., 2017),
T
(q,r)
S =
{
(x, y) : x ≥ Φ−1q
(∑
k∈S
tkΦq(xk)
)
, y ≤ Φ−1r
(∑
k∈S
tkΦr(yk)
)
, t > 0
}
,
is a generalization of the CES-CET model since the variable returns to scale
constraint
∑
k∈S tk = 1 is dropped. Andriamasy et al. (2017) show that this
technology satisfies α-returns to scale, that is, for all λ > 0,
(x, y) ∈ T (q,r)S implies (λx, λαy) ∈ T (q,r)S .
Recently, Ravelojaona (2019) introduces a directional distance function rele-
vant to technologies T (q,r) with two parameters. In the context of aggregate
technologies and firm games, this directional distance function may be rewrit-
ten as:
v(S) ≡ D
T
(q,r)
S
(
Φq∑
k∈S
xk,
Φr∑
k∈S
yk; g
)
.
On this basis, because α = q/r, the aggregation bias of technical inefficiency
becomes:
ABα(S; g) = DTSα
(
Φq∑
k∈S
xk,
Φr∑
k∈S
yk; g
)
−
φα∑
k∈S
DTk(x
k, yk; g).
The aggregation bias may be either positive, negative or null. As shown
in the first proposition below, there are several cases to consider, for instance
q → −∞ and r → +∞ such that |q| ≫ |r|. In this case, everything happens
as if, in the firm game, all firms merge by minimizing their inputs over each
dimension (labor, capital, and so on), and in the same time, they merge by
maximizing their outputs. The technology of coalition S is said to be super-
efficient in the sense that it allows input waste to be avoided while increasing
the number of outputs (input and output complementarity). Cooperation
reduces the aggregate technology inefficiency since the aggregation bias is
always non-positive: The structural inefficiency is lower than the inefficiency
mean (industrial inefficiency).
On the other hand, the parameter α → ∞ could be decomposed such
that q → +∞ and r → −∞. In this case, the firms merge however they are
sub-efficient, since they are organized in such a way that they employ too
much inputs for a few outputs. The joint technology is more inefficient than
the industrial inefficiency because the aggregation bias is positive. However,
these cases do not tell us the whole story about the possible improvement of
technical efficiency due to cooperation between firms. A desirable property
of cooperation is that of subadditivity of the game.
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Definition 6.1 – Subadditive games: The firm game is subadditive if,
for all S,R ⊆ N such that S ∩R = ∅,
v (S ∪R) ≤ v (S) + v (R) .
Because the game v represents the directional distance function of any
given coalition of firms, it is desirable to get subadditive games, in which case
the cooperation inherent to coalition S implies an improvement of technical
efficiency for the coalition (or a decrease of technical inefficiency equivalent
to a decrease of the distance function). In contrast to this, the distance
function is superadditive if, for all S,R ⊆ N such that S ∩R = ∅,
v (S ∪R) ≥ v (S) + v (R) .
Proposition 6.1 (subadditivity and complementarity) Let (N, v,Φα)
be a firm game such that each firm’s technology is such that T k = T
(q,r)
S and
respects (T1)-(T4) for all k ∈ S with ∑k∈S Φα(T k) = T (q,r)S .
(i) If α→ −∞ such that q → −∞ and r → +∞ with |q| ≫ |r|, then:
(i.a) The distance function DT (q,r) is subadditive.
(i.b) limα→−∞ABα(S; g) ≤ 0.
(i.c) T
(q,r)
S satisfies directional input complementarity for all S ⊆ N .
(i.d) T
(q,r)
S satisfies directional output complementarity for all S ⊆ N .
(ii) If α→ −∞ such that q → +∞ and r → −∞ with |q| ≫ |r|, then:
(ii.a) The distance function DT (q,r) is superadditive.
(ii.b) limα→−∞ABα(S; g) ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ N .
Proof:
(i.a): Take S,R ⊂ N , such that S ∩ R ̸= ∅. Since T k = T (q,r)S = T (q,r)S∪R, from
weak monotonicity and q → −∞ and r → +∞, it comes that,
D
T
(q,r)
S∪R
( ∧
k∈S∪R
xk,
∨
k∈S∪R
yk; g
)
≤ D
T
(q,r)
S
(∧
k∈S
xk,
∨
k∈S
yk; g
)
and,
D
T
(q,r)
S∪R
( ∧
k∈S∪R
xk,
∨
k∈S∪R
yk; g
)
≤ D
T
(q,r)
R
(∧
k∈R
xk,
∨
k∈R
yk; g
)
.
Then, for all S,R ⊂ N such that S ∩R ̸= ∅:
2D
T
(q,r)
S∪R
( ∧
k∈S∪R
xk,
∨
k∈S∪R
yk; g
)
≤ D
T
(q,r)
S
(∧
k∈S
xk,
∨
k∈S
yk; g
)
+D
T
(q,r)
R
(∧
k∈R
xk,
∨
k∈R
yk; g
)
,
and the result follows.
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(i.b): By (T4), it follows that the directional distance function is weakly
monotonic on T k, that is, (xk, yk), (u, v) ∈ T k such that u 6 y and v > x
imply that DTk(u, v; g) ≥ DTk(xk, yk; g). First, we remark that,
D
T
(q,r)
S
(
lim
q→−∞
Φq∑
k∈S
xk, lim
r→+∞
Φr∑
k∈S
yk; g
)
= D
T
(q,r)
S
(∧
k∈S
xk,
∨
k∈S
yk; g
)
Since T k = T
(q,r)
S , from weak monotonicity we have for all k ∈ S:
D
T
(q,r)
S
(∧
k∈S
xk,
∨
k∈S
yk; g
)
≤ DTk
(
xk,
∨
k∈S
yk; g
)
≤ min
k∈S
DTk
(
xk, yk; g
)
Thus,
D
T
(q,r)
S
(
lim
q→−∞
Φq∑
k∈S
xk, lim
r→+∞
Φr∑
k∈S
yk; g
)
≤ min
k∈S
DTk(x
k, yk; g)
This is equivalent to:
D
T
(q,r)
S
(
lim
q→−∞
Φq∑
k∈S
xk, lim
r→+∞
Φr∑
k∈S
yk; g
)
≤ lim
α→−∞
Φα∑
k∈S
DTk(x
k, yk; g)
Therefore, limα→−∞ABα(S; g) ≤ 0.
(i.c) and (i.d) follow from Propositions 4.1 and 4.2.
(ii.a)–(ii.b) can be proven with the same reasoning as in (i.a)–(i.b).
Proposition 6.1 provides some simple conditions that support coopera-
tion (subadditive games) when each firm has α-returns to scale technologies.
Moreover, technologies with α-returns to scale characterized by subadditive
games are compatible with a non-positive aggregation bias. The non-positive
sign of the aggregation bias is a tool to select some coalitions that improve
technical efficiency when the size of the coalitions increase. Also, when the
bias is positive, it is a tool allowing for more inefficiency removal when firms
contemplate doing some mergers. Finally, these technologies associated with
subadditive games satisfy simultaneously directional complementarity in in-
puts and in outputs.
7 Conclusion
In this paper it has been shown, at a sectoral level, that it is possible to
measure technical efficiency of any given coalition following two ways. The
first one is the generalized mean of the technical efficiency of each firm of
the coalition and the second one is the structural technical efficiency of a
coalition computed with an aggregate technology.
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Based on the standard axioms of the literature of productivity measure-
ment, it is first shown that both measures of inefficiency do not necessarily
coincide for CRS technologies. However, if the firms of the coalition employ
the same technique, both measures of technical inefficiency may coincide. In
this respect, the technical inefficiency of each firm (the game) is a gener-
alized mean of inputs and outputs vectors. The case of CRS technologies
with firms employing the same technique associated with directional output
complementarity provides a non-empty core.
Finally, in the case of α-returns to scale technologies, the aggregation
bias may be either negative or positive. Also, even if there is no guarantee to
have a solution in the core of the firm game, the games may be subadditive,
in other terms, the cooperation between firms improves technical efficiency.
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